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Abstract
The idea of applying a Cash on Delivery Aid (COD Aid) approach to the health sector has been 
raised many times, particularly in relation to addressing malaria, HIV/AIDS, maternal health, and 
water. After assessing the challenges of applying COD Aid in the health sector, this paper considers 
10 indicators related to reducing child mortality, maternal mortality, and infections of malaria and 
HIV/AIDS. It provides guidance to those interested in designing COD Aid approaches to improve 
health outcomes in developing countries.
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The Center for Global Development (CGD) has been working on a new approach to 
foreign aid called Cash on Delivery Aid (COD Aid) in which donors commit to make 
payments in direct proportion to measured progress towards a shared objective. The COD 
Aid approach builds on a trend in foreign aid modalities to pay for results and give greater 
autonomy to recipient countries in determining how to spend aid funds (summarized by the 
term “country ownership”). The approach has been described in detail in Birdsall and 
Savedoff, Cash on Delivery: A New Approach to Foreign Aid (2010), which includes a specific 
proposal to help countries achieve universal primary schooling and a chapter exploring 
applications of the concept to other sectors. Additional materials are available on the CGD 
website (www.cgdev.org). 
The idea of COD Aid emerged from an analysis of the basic relationships between those 
who fund and receive international assistance (Barder and Birdsall 2006) and is applicable to 
almost any sector if the challenges of identifying, defining, measuring, and verifying an 
appropriate indicator can be met. The idea of applying a COD Aid approach to the health 
sector has been raised in a number of different contexts, with particular interest expressed in 
addressing malaria, HIV/AIDS, maternal health, and water. Birdsall and Savedoff (2010) 
describe how the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) shared similar 
features with COD Aid in the case of immunization. Hallett and Over (2010) describe a 
strategy through which donors could provide incentives to developing countries to achieve 
measureable reductions in the rate of new HIV infections. Kaplan (2010) has explored the 
issues in utilizing a COD Aid approach to increase access to drinking water in developing 
countries.  
This paper assesses the challenges of applying COD Aid in the health sector by providing 
information on a number of indicators that could be used for a COD Aid agreement. It is 
meant to serve as a starting point for anyone considering the use of a COD Aid approach to 
improve health outcomes in developing countries. 
What is Cash on Delivery Aid (COD Aid)? 
COD Aid generally involves a contract between a donor and a recipient country government 
linking disbursements to progress toward an agreed-upon goal, such as completion of 
primary school or access to potable water. Key elements of COD Aid are as follows:1 
                                                       
1 Birdsall and Savedoff 2010, pp. 18ff. 
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  Payment for outcomes, not inputs. The outcomes have to be related to an objective 
shared by funder and recipient. Outcomes should be measurable and continuous so 
that incremental progress can be rewarded over time. 
  Hands-off funders, responsible recipients. Funders do not specify or monitor 
inputs, but rather verify progress and pay for outcomes in accordance with the 
COD Aid contract. 
  Transparency through public dissemination. Both the contract and progress 
measures should be as simple as possible and publicly disseminated. This increases 
credibility and accountability, and encourages broader social engagement in aspects 
of progress that are not part of the contract. 
  Independent verification. Both the funder and the recipient need to have confidence 
in the integrity of the measurement of progress. 
  Complementary with other existing aid programs. COD Aid is intended to 
complement and not disrupt ongoing programs, whether funded by local or external 
sources. A COD Aid program aims to facilitate the more effective use of available 
resources.  
The benefits of such agreements, in terms of increasing country ownership, coordinating 
donor activities, reducing transaction costs, encouraging innovation, and promoting local 
learning, are contrasted with other aid modalities and discussed in Birdsall and Savedoff 
(2010).  
Because the COD Aid approach pays for outcomes, it shares similarities with a range of 
initiatives that are already being used extensively in the health sector, including performance-
based incentives (Eichler and Levine 2009); results-based financing (Musgrove 2010); 
performance-based financing (Soeters and others 2006); and output based aid (GPOBA 
2010). However, COD Aid differs in at least two major ways: it is focused on the 
relationship between donors and recipient countries and it is explicitly “hands-off.”  
First, COD Aid is aimed at altering the relationship between donors and recipient countries. 
This contrasts with most other results-oriented approaches which envision financial 
incentives as an instrument to influence the behavior of health personnel, facilities and 
districts so as to improve the quantity and quality of care or to influence families and 
individuals so that they engage in healthier behaviors (Musgrove 2010 and Savedoff 2011). 
By contrast, COD Aid is primarily envisioned as a proposal for a donor to provide payments 
directly to a national (or provincial) government. The recipient then has the discretion to 
choose its own strategy for accelerating progress. It can choose to disburse funds as 
incentives to districts, facilities, families or patients. It could, alternatively, choose to address 
national political constraints, reform institutions or engage with the private sector. By 
focusing on a high-level outcome and transferring funds directly to the recipient 
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government, COD Aid can address problems at a level that most other results-based 
approaches cannot reach: the political context within which health care personnel, 
communities and citizens function.  
The second way in which COD Aid differs from most other results-oriented approaches is 
that it is explicitly “hands-off,” with conditions in the contract restricted to independently 
verifying the outcome measure and publicly disseminating results. This differs from most 
other results-oriented approaches in the health field, which usually require funders and 
recipients to maintain close engagement in the design and operation of the program. This 
can lower transaction costs, allowing recipients to spend less time and effort explaining, 
negotiating and reporting to donors and more time and effort focused on implementing the 
strategies they have chosen. With COD Aid, funders can engage closely with the recipient 
country but only if explicitly requested by the recipient. Furthermore, recipients have full 
discretion over the use of funds, which can be applied inside or outside the health sector as 
they choose.  
Applying COD Aid to Health 
A basic prerequisite for using a COD Aid approach is that funders and recipients have some 
shared goal to which they are willing to commit. In the health sector, funders and recipients 
have adopted a large number of goals, sometimes stated as legal commitments and 
obligations, other times as targets of specific programs. One of the most widely cited 
international agreements on development are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
– a list of eight international development goals endorsed by 192 countries and 23 
international organizations. Three of these MDGs are health objectives – reducing child 
mortality (Goal 4), improving maternal health (Goal 5) and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases (Goal 6) (see Appendix 1). Any one of these goals could serve as the basis 
for developing a COD Aid agreement. Due to their prominence in international policy 
debates and public commitments, this paper will focus on these goals as the most likely 
focus of a COD Aid initiative in health. 
A second key issue in applying COD Aid to health is finding an appropriate measure of 
progress toward the shared goal. The choice and definition of this indicator is critical 
because financial incentives can be extremely powerful. To improve the chances of success, 
the outcome measure should be closely related to the goal and minimize the risk of inducing 
distortions and unintended consequences. In health, broader outcome measures such as 
reductions in mortality are less likely to create distortions than measures related to specific 
interventions, diseases or health risks. So, for example, while increasing the use of 
insecticide-treated bednets in areas where malaria is common may be an effective 
intervention in many cases, creating a large financial incentive for increased coverage and use 
of bednets might lead recipients to shift resources towards this method of combating malaria 
even when alternatives might be preferable or innovations would be beneficial. Similarly, 
paying for reductions in the prevalence of an infectious disease like malaria might lead to 
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overtreatment and encourage the emergence of drug-resistant pathogens. A further 
advantage of broad outcome measures is that they may promote the development of public 
health policies and stronger health institutions necessary for coordinating and implementing 
a range of activities rather than fragmenting or privileging a particular component of a 
country’s health system. 
A third issue that commands special attention in the health sector is whether outcomes can 
be measured with sufficient precision. For example, reductions in the maternal mortality 
ratio would seem to be the ideal indicator for reducing maternal mortality, but measuring 
this indicator can be rather difficult in practice for several reasons. Maternal mortality is 
sufficiently rare (even in developing countries) that it requires very large samples or 
comprehensive vital registration systems to be captured reliably and with adequate precision. 
Consequently, the indicator might not be measurable with sufficient provision to serve as the 
basis of a COD Aid agreement at present. Similarly, it is probably better to pay for 
reductions in new infections for HIV/AIDS rather than a reduction in prevalence, because 
the latter measure is affected by both new infections and the success of life-preserving 
treatments (Over 2010a). Nevertheless, prevalence can be measured more precisely than 
incidence in most contexts. 
Fourth, the chosen indicator has to be relatively simple to explain. Birdsall and Savedoff 
(2010) note that the success of a COD Aid arrangement requires transparency if it is to 
encourage better accountability. This means that when an agreement is signed, policymakers 
understand what they are trying to achieve, funders understand what they are paying for, and 
constituents in both funder and recipient countries understand what is a success and what is 
a failure. For example, it is easier to explain that a funder has paid US$1,000 for “a child who 
has survived to the age of five” than to explain that US$1,000 was paid for “a change in 
child mortality rates relative to a trend that was projected on the basis of a sophisticated 
epidemiological model.” 
Thus, the choice of indicator is crucial and requires work to assure that it represents a shared 
goal and is strongly associated with outcomes associated with that goal, is measurable with 
sufficient precision, and is easily explained and disseminated to the public. Our experience 
with convening experts and policymakers to develop an agreement for the education sector, 
along with our initial research into the health sector, make us optimistic that a process of 
research, consultation, debate and analytical work can lead to a viable proposal for applying 
COD Aid to one or more of the health MDGs. 
To guide this process, the following questions need to be addressed: 
Would a COD Aid approach work better with a broad or narrow goal?  
Broad indicators – such as reducing maternal or child mortality – are preferable in a number 
of ways. They are more likely to be associated with important shared goals. They also 
encompass a wider range of potential interventions and health risks and are thus less likely to 
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encourage distortions in allocations across diseases or strategies. However, narrow indicators 
– such as increased Skilled Birth Attendance or reduced incidence of malaria – also have 
advantages. They may be easier to measure with precision and they may be more responsive 
to efforts undertaken by the aid recipient. 
Are the costs of measurement and verification manageable? 
Most developing countries that would participate in a COD Aid agreement do not have 
comprehensive vital registration systems and even census data, used for developing sampling 
frames, can be problematic. Yet a COD Aid agreement relies heavily on the quality and 
timeliness of reports on the outcome. Therefore, most of the attention in developing a COD 
Aid agreement is focused on establishing a credible, reliable and precise measurement 
system. One approach would be to rely on reports from a Health Management Information 
System which are then verified by an independently administered population survey. 
Another approach would be to rely exclusively on an independent survey. It is also possible 
to include incentives for better vital registration – such as a nominal payment for each 
pregnant woman who is identified and recorded in a registry – which would then strengthen 
subsequent measurements of maternal or child survival.2  
How should a COD Aid agreement relate to existing streams of international 
financial assistance? 
In the last decade, the amount of international health assistance provided to low-income 
countries has increased substantially and much of it is directed toward recurrent costs – staff 
salaries, drugs and supplies. This raises two questions which have proved tractable in other 
sectors. First, how large do COD Aid payments have to be if they are going to command the 
attention of policymakers who are already dealing with large aid flows in the sector? For 
example, a contract that promises a country a few extra million dollars for reducing maternal 
mortality may not have much impact when policymakers are concerned with assuring 
disbursement of programs worth hundreds of millions of dollars from GAVI, GFATM or 
PEPFAR.3 Secondly, is there a risk that commitments to a COD Aid agreement might 
displace commitments to upfront costs such as investments and recurrent expenditures? In 
most other sectors, foreign aid is a relatively small share of total expenditure and such a shift 
would not compromise service delivery. However, in a significant number of low-income 
countries, foreign aid to the health sector provides a significant share of recurrent costs. In 
such a context, the implications of introducing a COD Aid approach for sustaining these 
activities needs to be carefully considered. 
                                                       
2 The payment would have to be nominal to avoid the unintended consequence of encouraging increases in 
fertility. 
3 GAVI is the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations; GFATM is the Global Fund to Fight Aids 
TB and Malaria; and PEPFAR is the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. As one example, Ethiopia 
received $351 million from GAVI, GFATM and PEPFAR in 2006 compared to taxpayer-funded health spending 
that same year of $130 million (Savedoff and Grépin, forthcoming). 
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How much should a COD Aid agreement pay? 
Birdsall and Savedoff (2010) argued that COD Aid payments do not need to be related to 
the costs of service provision but rather should be scaled in relation to the amounts needed 
to attract the attention of policymakers. As noted above, the large amount of foreign 
assistance for health creates a higher threshold for COD Aid to establish an incentive that is 
salient to the recipient’s decision processes. In the education sector, Birdsall and Savedoff 
(2010) proposed paying US$200 for each additional child who takes a competency test in the 
final year of primary school. This generated initial aid flows of US$2 million per year, rising 
to US$30 million per year as progress accelerates, for a country with more than half a million 
children in each age cohort. Similar simulations are required for assessing different amounts 
of payment for reducing maternal and child mortality and averting infections. 
What is the appropriate structure of payment, a single indicator or multiple ones?  
The simplest COD Aid agreements are those for which a single good indicator can be 
identified. Such indicators are usually easier to find for outcomes that represent measurable 
investments that are concluded at a particular time or outcomes that, once achieved, require 
no further maintenance. Most health outcomes, however, do not fall into these categories. 
The most intuitive indicator for combating infectious diseases is the number of infections 
averted. However, for most diseases, slowing the rate of new infections this year does not 
necessarily keep new infection rates low in subsequent years without continuing efforts. 
Some of the health indicators proposed for discussion in this paper are single indicators, 
such as the standard Parasite Rate for measuring malaria. Others are multiple indicators, 
such as creating a schedule that includes small payments for registering births and with 
sequentially larger annual payments for children surviving to age five. The latter payment 
schedule is more complex but may be justified because it rewards birth registration, a 
worthwhile goal in itself, and then creates an appropriate sequence of incentives through a 
child’s riskiest years. 
Should an agreement be based on additional or total achievements? 
Most funders see financial assistance as a way to help recipient countries go above and 
beyond their current efforts to improve development. For a long time, most funders would 
not even consider financing recurrent costs of public services. This issue comes to the fore 
with COD Aid payments because they are intended to be incentives for recipients to do 
something additional to already-existing programs in achieving the goal. All of this suggests 
that COD Aid payments should be aimed at additional achievements. For example, rather 
than paying for every child who survives to age five, a COD Aid agreement would be 
rewarding additional effort if it only paid for every child who survives to age five above and 
beyond the number who currently survive to age five. Similarly, a COD Aid agreement to 
combat the spread of infectious diseases might pay for reductions in incidence relative to 
that which would have been expected in the absence of additional effort. 
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The advantages of paying only for additional achievements are twofold: they concentrate the 
incentive on the additional efforts required by the recipient and they satisfy the funders’ 
desire to create an improvement over current conditions. Paying for additional 
achievements, however, can be difficult in cases where an accurate baseline or counterfactual 
cannot be easily estimated or explained. For example, paying for “additional children who 
survive to age five” makes the most sense in a context where each cohort has the same 
number of newborn infants and faces similar levels of risk. Under these conditions, 
additional efforts by the recipient to increase the number of infants who survive to age five 
can be measured by subtracting the number of children who survived to age five last year 
from the number who survived this year. However, when the number of children in each 
cohort and the kinds of risks they face vary significantly over time this baseline might lead 
the indicator to over or underestimate the additional survivors. In such cases, the COD Aid 
agreement can establish a baseline estimated from underlying trends or it may simply choose 
to pay for total achievement. 
In many cases, baselines can be estimated using existing data and models. For the example of 
child survival, it would be relatively easy to take current survival rates and adjust them for 
changes in the size of the cohort. A detailed discussion of estimating counterfactuals can be 
found in Hallett and Over (2010) who show how a COD Aid agreement could pay for 
“averted infections” measured as the difference between actual HIV infection rates and 
those predicted using mathematical models. A comparable effort could establish a 
counterfactual prediction for maternal or child mortality against which the number of 
registered deaths would be compared, with COD Aid paying for the difference.  
When estimated baselines appear to complex, a COD Aid agreement could be structured to 
pay for total achievements, e.g. all children who survive to age five or all mothers who 
survive childbirth. The choice between paying for additional achievements (e.g. additional 
children who survive to age five) and paying for total achievements (e.g. all children who 
survive to age five) involves tradeoffs Paying only for additional achievements creates a 
stronger incentive for additional efforts and is preferable for funders who do not want to 
finance current and ongoing efforts. However, in those cases where paying for additional 
achievements requires elaborating complicated baseline estimates, it may be preferable to pay 
for total achievements. Paying for total achievements in these cases can be simpler to 
measure and explain but harder to promote. We generally find, however, that credible 
baselines can be established against which to measure additional effort. 
* * * 
The remainder of this document describes a series of indicators that have been proposed as 
candidates for COD Aid in health and which are associated with the MDGs for reducing 
child mortality; improving maternal health; and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases (See Table 1). The first three indicators are directly associated with reducing child 
mortality: the under-five mortality rate, stunting (height-for-age), and low birth weight. A discussion 
of immunization coverage, which would necessarily involve the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
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and Immunization (GAVI), can be found in Birdsall and Savedoff (2010). Low birth weight 
is also associated with improving maternal health, but we consider reducing maternal 
mortality as well as other proxies for maternal health such as the intrapartum death rate and 
skilled birth attendance. For combating disease, we present measures for sustaining HIV/AIDS 
treatment, averting HIV/AIDS infections, sustaining reductions in the incidence of malaria and reducing 
the incidence of malaria. The final indicator, improved birth registration, is not directly associated 
with MDGs but is linked to improving information necessary for long-term improvements 
in health policy. In each case, the indicator’s definition is provided along with information 
about its reliability as a proxy for a health outcome, its responsiveness to policy, its 
vulnerability to unintended consequences, and its amenability to precise measurement. 
Options for structuring payments on each indicator are also presented. 
 
Table 1: Health Indicators Discussed in this Paper 
 
Indicators for Reducing Child Mortality 
Under-Five Mortality 
Child Stunting (Height-for-Age) 
Low Birth Weight 
 
Indicators for Reducing Maternal Mortality 
Maternal Mortality 
Intrapartum Death Rate 
Skilled Birth Attendance 
 
Indicators for Combating HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
HIV/AIDS: Sustaining Treatment 
HIV/AIDS: Averted Infections 
Malaria: Reducing or Sustaining Reductions in the Prevalence of Malaria  
 
Indicator for Improving Health Information for Public Health Policy 
Number of Accurately Registered Births 
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Indicators for Reducing Child Mortality 
Under-Five Mortality  
Definition. The child mortality rate is defined as the probability that a child born in a specific 
year or period will die before the age of five, expressed as a rate per 1,000 live births. In 
2007, the global under-five mortality rate was 67 deaths per 1,000 births (roughly 9 million 
children died). Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s highest child mortality rates (143 deaths 
per 1,000 births) (UN Millennium Development Goals Report, 2009). 
Is the indicator a good proxy for a health outcome? Child survival is a direct health outcome. 
The under-five mortality rate is not only considered a leading indicator of a country’s level of 
child health but it is also used outside the health field as a measure of overall development 
(Becker and others 2006). Of the roughly 9 million under-five deaths that occur each year, 
nearly 70 percent of these are directly attributable to six causes: respiratory infections, 
diarrhea, malaria, neonatal infection, preterm delivery, and lack of oxygen at birth (WHO 
2005).  
Is the indicator responsive to policy? The majority of child deaths are due to causes that are 
either preventable or treatable (Becker and others 2006). Immunization campaigns, 
micronutrient supplement programs, and improved access to clean water are proven cost-
effective interventions that have significantly reduced child mortality. A COD Aid agreement 
paying against reductions in the country’s child mortality rate would provide the recipient 
with an incentive to choose a mix of interventions that are likely to reduce mortality in this 
age group. Another advantage of this indicator is that it is a widely recognized gauge of a 
country’s overall health and development. This provides intuitive appeal and makes the 
indicator more useful for marshaling political support (Becker and others 2006).  
Is this indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? Because child mortality is a broad, 
widely-acceptable indicator of a population’s health and development, its measurability is 
considerably better than many others. For example, the Knowledge, Practice and Coverage 
(KPC) Surveys have long been the standard tool used by donors and researchers for their 
population‐level baseline studies (USAID 2005). The Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) conducted by MACRO are another standards source of information on child 
mortality rates.  
Administrative reporting and surveys can be combined to produce reliable and precise 
estimates. Reports from health facilities, hospitals and vital registration campaigns do not 
reach everyone and this undermines their reliability and precision. Survey methods can 
provide less biased estimates but their confidence intervals may be wide unless sample sizes 
are sufficiently large and good sampling frames can be developed.  
A COD aid agreement could pay for the absolute number of children who survive or for 
increasing the share of survivors registered at birth relative to an earlier cohort. The absolute 
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number of children who survive is easier to explain than the shares of survivors. The former 
would be explained as “US$250 paid for each registered newborn who survives to age five in 
a given year” while the latter would have to be explained as, perhaps, “US$2.5 million paid 
for each 1 percent increase in the share of registered newborns who reach age five in a given 
year compared to the share of survivors in the cohort born one year before them”. 
Difficulties associated with showing progress under both payment methods would differ 
depending on the country’s demographic patterns. In high fertility countries, the rapid 
increase in birthrates would probably make achieving progress on the absolute measure 
easier than on the increase in shares. 
The reward structure could incorporate both intermediate and final outcomes, for example, 
by paying for each birth that is officially registered and then paying for each year of 
subsequent child survival.  
Unintended consequences. Paying for the absolute number of survivors could potentially 
encourage higher fertility, while paying for survival as a fraction of registered births may 
provide disincentives for birth registration (recipients may be less likely to register unhealthy 
newborns if it is believed that they are unlikely to survive). Paying for birth registration could 
redress the latter imbalance. Regarding the former, the risk of encouraging fertility may be 
small if payments are made to the government and not directly to households and 
individuals. This risk might also be diminished if the payments per child are set high enough 
to provide an incentive in the aggregate to the government but low enough that they have 
negligible effects on personal fertility decisions. 
Options for payment. In developing a COD Aid agreement for reducing child mortality, a 
working group would have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different terms 
of payment. For example: 
a.  The agreement could pay for registered births and provide additional payments for 
each registered child who survives up to the age of five. The payment could be 
annual or only at specified intervals (e.g. at ages one, three and five).  
b.  The agreement could restrict its payments for child survival among families from 
the poorest 40 percent of the population or in rural areas. While this would target 
groups in which children face the greatest health risks, it would also introduce 
complications in measurement and verification. 
c.  The agreement could focus on raising the number of children surviving to age five, 
that is, only paying for the number of children who survive over and above a 
baseline or projected trend. This approach creates a clearer incentive for progress 
and incremental efforts. However, it requires establishing and updating a baseline. It 
also becomes somewhat more difficult to explain, i.e. which of the children that 




For Discussion: A COD Aid Proposal for Improving Child Survival  
Payments 
  First 5 years, funders pay US$5 for each registered birth (in order to establish 
baseline and improve vital registration – fee large enough to create incentive 
and provide an initial flow of unrestricted funds without creating risk of 
increased fertility). 
  Years 3 to 5, funders pay US$25 for each registered child who receives a health 
checkup at ages 3 and 5. 
  After 5 years, funders pay US$250 for each registered child who survives to age 
3 and 5 above the numbers who survived 5 years earlier. In subsequent years, 
the baseline is updated annually (i.e. always measured against a five-year lag). 
(Note: the agreement then has a self-limiting feature with funding declining to 
zero five years after both registration and survival stop increasing). 
Eligibility  
Any low-income country that can meet the reporting standards would be eligible to sign 
an agreement up to a cap established by available funds. The reporting eligibility 
requirements would include: 
  A national vital registration system for reporting births and tracking children 
through their 5
th birthday. 
  A national registration system for reporting birthdates and the total number of 
children of a certain age at a given time.  
Conditions 
Countries that sign the agreement would agree: 
  To allow independent verification of the vital registration process  
  To allow independent verification of the number of births and survival data (by 
permitting audits and independent surveys) 
  To publicly disseminate information regarding the agreement (number of 
registered births and number of children who survive to age 3 and 5, payments 
received, child mortality estimates, etc.). 
  To assist researchers in evaluating the COD Aid agreement. 
 
 
Child Stunting (Height-for-Age) 
Definition. Stunting occurs when a child fails to grow at a normal rate, usually due to 
malnutrition or illness. Children are considered to be stunted if their measured height is 
more than two standard deviations below the median height for children their same age as 
reported in the height-for-age charts of the National Center for Health Statistics 
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(NCHS)/WHO for a reference population. (“Severe stunting” is defined as more than three 
standard deviations below the NCHS /WHO reference median) (Becker and others 2006).  
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? Child stunting is associated with higher 
morbidity and mortality, greater risk of illness, reduced educational achievement, and lower 
productivity in adulthood. Growth patterns in childhood are strong indicators of future 
health, human capital, and social development (Monteiro and others 2010).  
Because stunting is characteristically a sign of poor nutrition, it is often used as a proxy for 
food security and nutrition-related programs rather than health status (Becker and others 
2006). However, the relationship between stunting and (1) maternal health services, (2) 
neonatal health services, and (3) childhood illness make height-for-age a useful proxy for a 
population’s overall health, and an indicator of a government’s overall investment in health 
(Sethuraman and others 2003). The 2005 CGD Global Health Indicators Working Group 
concluded that stunting may be an appropriate proxy for health, nutrition, women’s 
education, discrimination against women, and family planning (Becker and others 2006). 
Is the indicator responsive to policy? Poor nutrition is the main contributing factor to child 
stunting. Child stunting is also influenced by related factors such as: household food 
insecurity, low parental educational attainment, and lack of access to health care and poor 
living conditions. Interventions that specifically address aspects of maternal and child health 
(including immunization), nutrition, birth spacing, and education (including literacy 
programs) have been shown to reduce stunting prevalence among children under five in 
developing countries (Milman and others 2005, Gribble, Murray and Menotti, 2009).4 
The Nutrition Framework of the United Nations Children’s Fund provides more 
information on the underlying (family purchasing power, maternal education); intermediate 
(access to health care, water and sanitation, food security, and appropriate health care); and 
proximate (diarrheal diseases) determinants of undernutrition (UNICEF 1990). One study of 
child stunting in Brazil from 1996 to 2007 showed that two-thirds of the observed decline 
could be attributed to four factors, all of which are responsive to policy. These factors were 
maternal educational attainment, family purchasing power, maternal and child health care 
services, and coverage of water supply and sanitation services (Monteiro and others 2010). 
Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? Previous studies have used 
Demographic and Health Surveys to measure rates of stunting at the country level. 
Nationwide probability household samples can be obtained using census-based, multistage, 
stratified, and cluster sampling procedures (Monteiro and others 2010). Measurements of 
recumbent length of children aged up to 23 months and the standing height of older 
                                                       
4 The fact that family planning and longer birth spacing help poor households sustain the nutrition of their 
children suggests that a COD agreement for reduced stunting could offset any unintended incentive for higher 
fertility generated by a COD agreement for birth registration and child survival. The two programs could be 
explicitly combined by increasing the payments for child survival with the stature of the child. 
12 
 
children can be obtained in these surveys through the use of trained personnel, while birth 
dates can be obtained from birth certificates and other official documents where they exist. 
The standard for what constitutes stunting could be determined through the use of Child 
Growth Standards of the World Health Organization (WHO) to calculate length-for-age and 
height-for-age Z scores. A child would be classified as stunted if his or her height-for-age Z 
score was below -2 (the prevalence of stunting and its 95 percent confidence interval will 
also be calculated) (Monteiro and others 2010). Factors to address would include the need 
for improved vital registration, data collection, and trained personnel to identify and validate 
height-for-age statistics. 
Unintended Consequences. The most likely unintended consequences for this measure are 
likely to involve either manipulation of the measurements or interpretation of measurements. 
For example, if children are intentionally reported to be younger than they are, then stunting 
will be underestimated.5 In an extreme case, paying for increases in height-for-age could 
encourage obesity. While recognizing that obesity is an increasing problem in many 
developing countries, it is our judgment that a payment to the government for reducing the 
number of children with stunting is unlikely to generate policy changes that would promote 
obesity. Nevertheless, this is the kind of potential consequence that should be monitored 
and addressed if it proves to be a problem. 
Options for payment. In developing a COD Aid agreement for reducing stunting in child 
populations a working group would have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
different terms of payment. For example: 
a.  The agreement could pay a fixed amount for each child between the ages of 0 and 5 
who is not stunted, i.e. whose height-for-age Z score is above -2.  
b.  The agreement could restrict its payments to children from the poorest 40 percent 
of the population or in rural areas on the presumption that targeting this 
disadvantaged population is of greater priority and that paying higher income 
families to assure their children’s appropriate growth is unnecessary. However, this 
approach does introduce additional difficulties in establishing a family’s 
socioeconomic status or geographic residency. 
c.  The agreement could pay for children who are not stunted or only for the number 
above a baseline. Paying only for increments above a baseline creates a clearer 
incentive for progressing beyond current conditions. However, establishing a 
baseline might be problematic and the agreement might be easier to verify and 
explain if it were a simple payment for all children who are not stunted. 
                                                       
5 This unintended consequence could be avoided by combining a COD agreement for stunting with a COD 
agreement for birth registration and child survival as suggested in footnote 4. 
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d.  The agreement could pay for the absolute number of children whose height-for-age 
Z score is above -2 or for the share of children with acceptable height-for-age over 
the total number of children in the same age group in a given period of time. The 
latter, however, introduces additional sources of error or manipulation (i.e. the 
recipient could skew the studies by targeting regions with lower shares of stunting).  
e.  Payments could be based on simple binary criterion (i.e. whether or not the child 
meets the height-for-age standard) or disburse against total increases in height-for-
age (e.g. an additional payment for every additional unit increase, to be capped at an 
agreed-upon level).  
f.  Payments could also be made relative to a counterfactual. The funders and 
recipients would agree on the model that would be used to predict how many 
children would be stunted without additional efforts. Progress would be measured 
as the difference between the actual and projected numbers of children who are 
stunted, with the COD Aid agreement paying a fixed amount for each stunted 
condition averted. 
For Discussion: A COD Aid Proposal for Reducing Stunting 
Payments 
  First 5 years, funders pay US$5 for each registered birth in order to establish 
baseline and improve vital registration. The fee should be large enough to 
create a significant incentive and provide an initial flow of unrestricted funds 
without creating risk of providing an incentive for increased fertility.  
  First 5 years, funders pay US$25 for each child (age 1 to 5) whose height for age 
has a Z score of above -2.  
  After 5 years, funders pay US$250 for each child (age 1 to 5) whose height for 
age has a Z score above -2 above the number of children whose height for age 
had a Z score of above -2 5 years earlier. In subsequent years, the baseline is 
updated annually (i.e. always measured against a 5-year lag). (Note: the 
agreement then has a self-limiting feature with funding declining to zero 5 years 
after registration stops increasing and after stunting approaches zero.) 
Eligibility 
Any low-income country that can meet the reporting standards would be eligible to sign 
an agreement up to a limit established by available funds. These reporting standards 
would include: 
  The country has an internationally acceptable standard for reporting births and 
vital registration 
  The country has an internationally acceptable standard for reporting height-for-
age (e.g. Demographic and Health Surveys) 




Countries that sign the agreement would agree to the following:  
  To allow independent verification of indicator (by permitting audits and 
independent surveys). 
  To publicly disseminate information regarding the agreement (number /share of 
children above a certain height-for-age, payments received, child mortality 
estimates, etc.) 
  To assist researchers in evaluating the COD Aid agreement. 
 
 
Low Birth Weight 
Definition. Low birth weight is defined by the WHO as weight of less than 2500 grams 
(irrespective of gestational age). For live births, the WHO definition states that “birth weight 
should ideally be measured within the first hour of life before significant postnatal weight 
loss occurs.” Over 95 percent of the 20 million low birth weight infants born annually are in 
less developed countries (WHO 2005). 
Is the indicator a good proxy for health? Low birth weight is closely associated with a variety 
of health outcomes. Children born with low birth weight have significantly higher risks of 
neonatal and infant death and are also more vulnerable to a range of diseases (McCormick 
1985). In addition, low birth weight is strongly linked to poorer chances of survival, chronic 
conditions during adulthood, and lower long-term individual economic productivity (Barber 
and Gertler 2008). The relationship between low birth weight and health outcomes has led 
the United Nations to call for reducing the proportion of infants with low birth weight by 
one-third as one of the seven major goals of its current campaign for "A World Fit for 
Children.” 
Is the indicator responsive to policy? Although firm evidence is not available, experts believe 
that promising strategies for increasing birth weight include utilization of prenatal care 
services among expectant mothers, improving the quality of prenatal care services, and 
addressing maternal nutritional deficiencies (Institute of Medicine 1985; Alexander and 
Korenbrot 1995; Merialdi and others 2003; Bhutta and others 2005; Barber and Gertler 
2008). Barber and Gertler (2008) evaluated a Mexican program that provided cash transfers 
to pregnant women who obtained healthcare and nutritional supplements and attended 
health education sessions. They found the conditional cash incentives were effective in 
increasing the birth weight of children of beneficiaries relative to non-beneficiaries and 
attributed most of the improvement in birth outcomes to better quality of prenatal care. 
Is the measure quantifiable with sufficient precision? Birth weight data is frequently 
unavailable because it is not always recorded and, when recorded, it is often inaccurate. In 
2005, WHO estimated that only one third of babies worldwide are weighed at birth (WHO 
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Bulletin 2005). Improving the coverage and quality of birth weight data would therefore 
require improvements in vital registration, greater coverage of professional birth attendance, 
and training for those professionals in administering and recording weight at birth. Since 
birth weight is supposed to be recorded within the first hour after birth, it would be 
extremely difficult to retroactively verify whether birth weight is being accurately recorded. 
This difficulty would need to be addressed by any COD Aid contract since verification is so 
critical to the agreement.  
Administrative data from health facilities, hospitals and vital registration campaigns could be 
used to measure this indicator but suffer from biases due to incomplete coverage and 
weaknesses in reporting systems. Survey-based methods are likely to be less biased but have 
their own deficiencies. According to Blanc and Wardlaw (2005), current survey-based 
estimates of the prevalence of low birth weight are biased significantly downwards. They 
discuss two adjustments to address bias in reported data: a weighting method that merges 
reported birth weight with mothers' estimation of the child's size at birth, and categorization 
of one-quarter of the infants reported to weigh exactly 2500 grams at birth as having low 
birth weight. The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) core questionnaire has included a 
question on birth weight since 1990. Other surveys have questions on birth weight, birth size 
and prematurity such as the UNICEF-sponsored Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), 
Pan Arab Project for Child Development, and the Reproductive Health Surveys supported 
by the US Centers for Disease Control (Blanc and Wardlaw 2005). 
Potential unintended consequences. While payments for birth weight are aimed at reducing 
low birth weight, they could unintentionally encourage excessive weight gain, which can lead 
to birthing complications for the mother and obesity for the child. A program that provides 
incentives for increased birth weight would be inappropriate outside of contexts where 
malnutrition and low birth weight are a significant cause of infant and child morbidity (for 
example, Sub-Saharan Africa) and where the risks posed by obesity and other chronic 
diseases are low. Alternatively, the indicator could include a penalty or limit to assure that 
payments do not reward excess weight. 
Options for payment. In developing a COD Aid agreement for reducing low birth weight, a 
working group would have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different terms 
of payment, such as: 
a.  The agreement could pay for all infants who weigh more than 2500 grams at birth 
and who are born to women who registered during pregnancy.  
b.  The agreement could be restricted to paying for infants who weigh more than 2500 
grams at birth to families from the poorest 40 percent of the population or in rural 
areas, although this raises difficulties in establishing a family’s socioeconomic status 
or geographic residency. 
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c.  The agreement could pay for all infants who weigh more than 2500 grams at birth 
or for the number above a baseline measured for an earlier cohort.  
d.  The agreement could pay for the absolute number of infants born weighing 2500 
grams or more or for increasing the share of healthy infants as a portion of total 
number of births the same year. The absolute number of newborns that survive is 
easier to explain and does not require accurately measuring total births, although 
paying for the absolute number of children runs the risk of encouraging higher 
fertility. However, paying for survival as a fraction of total births may encourage 
recipients to underreport total births, especially among disadvantaged populations. 
e.  Payments could be based on simple binary criterion (i.e. whether or not the 
newborn weighs 2500 grams or more) or be disbursed at an incremental rate with 
increases in weight (e.g. an additional payment for every 5 grams of weight above 
2500 grams, to be capped at an agreed-upon level).  
For Discussion: A COD Aid Proposal for Reducing Low Birth Weight  
Payments 
  First 5 years, funders pay US$5 for each pregnant woman who registers with a 
health care provider (in order to establish baseline and improve vital 
registration – fee large enough to create incentive and provide an initial flow of 
unrestricted funds without creating risk of increased fertility). 
  First 5 years, funders pay US$25 for each newborn who weighs 2500 grams or 
more at birth. 
  After 5 years, funders pay US$250 for each newborn who weighs 2500 grams or 
more at birth in excess of a baseline set by the number of newborns with 
appropriate birth weight 5 years earlier. In subsequent years, the baseline is 
updated annually (i.e. always measured against a 5-year lag). (Note: the 
agreement then has a self-limiting feature with funding declining to zero 5 years 
after pregnancy registration stops increasing and the proportion with low birth 
weight stops declining). 
 
Eligibility  
Any low-income country that can meet the reporting standards would be eligible to sign 
an agreement up to a cap established by available funds. The reporting standards would 
involve: 
  The country has a system for registering pregnant women  
  The country has demonstrated the capacity to accurately record birth weight.  
  The country has a system for reporting births. 
 




Countries that sign the agreement would agree: 
  To allow independent verification of the number of children born at a given 
weight (by permitting audits and independent surveys). 
  To publicly disseminate information regarding the agreement (number of total, 
preterm and underweight births, number/portion of children born at a healthy 
birth weight, the proportion of infants not weighed at birth, payments received, 
preterm and infant mortality estimates, etc.) 
  To assist researchers in evaluating the COD Aid agreement. 
 
Indicators for Improving Maternal Health 
Maternal Mortality 
Definition. Maternal mortality is defined as the death of women during pregnancy, childbirth, 
or in the 42 days after delivery. In 2008, between 302,000 and 394,000 women died from 
maternal causes – causes of death which are largely preventable (Hogan and others, 2010). 
Maternal mortality is also a significant focus of many international development efforts and a 
primary target for Millennium Development Goal 5 (see Appendix 1). The majority of 
maternal deaths take place in developing countries, and the burden of maternal mortality is 
greatest in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.  
Is the indicator a good proxy for health? Maternal mortality is a direct health outcome. 
Maternal mortality is also strongly correlated with infant mortality during childbirth 
(McClure and others 2007) and is caused by similar issues (particularly obstructed or very 
long labor, eclampsia and infection such as syphilis) (Lawn, Cousens and others 2005). In 
addition, maternal mortality has significant implications for the long-term health of a 
mother’s older children and their life chances (National Research Council 2001). 
Is the indicator responsive to policy? The discrepancy between the burden of maternal 
mortality in developed and developing countries has been cited as the “largest of all public 
health statistics” (Ronsmans and others 2006) since it strongly suggests that high rates of 
maternal mortality in developing countries are largely preventable. While the main medical 
causes of death vary greatly by region, obstetric hemorrhage is the main medical cause of 
maternal death worldwide, with unsafe abortions and indirect causes (such as malaria and 
HIV/AIDS) playing a large role in some populations (Ronsmans and others 2006). Recent 
research from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) suggests that only 23 
countries are on track to reach the MDG 5 goal of a 75 percent reduction in maternal 
mortality ratios (MMR), although some countries (including Egypt, China, Ecuador and 
Bolivia) have seen accelerated progress since 1990 (Hogan and others 2010). 
18 
 
Although the medical interventions needed to prevent deaths due to pregnancy and 
childbirth exist, the empirical evidence surrounding the effectiveness of programs to reduce 
maternal mortality in developing countries is inconclusive. Between 1960 and 1986, Malaysia 
and Sri Lanka reduced their maternal mortality ratios by more than 50 percent. Researchers 
have attributed these successes to a combination of public policies that include: long-term 
investments in midwifery training and referral hospitals; broad, free access to healthcare and 
a supportive system with regulation, control, and supervision of medical and midwifery 
professions; gathering and use of information to guide policymaking; and targeted quality 
improvements to vulnerable groups (Ronsmans and others 2006). However, micro-level 
studies of specific interventions (including skilled birth attendance, access to clean delivery 
kits, and training of traditional birth attendants, and increased antenatal visits) have not 
conclusively shown significant impact on improving maternal health outcomes (Ronsmans 
and others 2006; Hogan and others 2010). This paradox may be resolved in the future by 
better micro-level studies or it may indicate that maternal health at the population level is not 
responsive to micro-level interventions – only to society-wide or system-wide efforts. 
Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? Accurately measuring the maternal 
mortality ratio is quite difficult. An extensive literature examines these difficulties, citing a 
number of problems related to weak vital registration systems, low professional birth 
attendance, poor data quality, and inadequate training in information collection, storage and 
processing (Ronsmans and others 2006; Graham and others 2008). Furthermore, maternal 
deaths are frequently under-reported due to misclassification of causes, uncertainty regarding 
diagnoses or existence of pregnancy, and sensitivity around issues such as abortion, 
miscarriage and HIV/AIDS. Maternal deaths are also relatively rare, even in developing 
countries, which means that survey-based estimates require large samples if they are to be 
measured within reasonable confidence intervals.  
Unintended Consequences. Reducing maternal mortality is a health outcome of great 
importance, and paying for it is unlikely to generate substantial distortions in terms of 
allocations of resources across disease groups, health risks or interventions. The greatest 
concerns in paying for reductions in maternal mortality are likely to be related to 
manipulation of data such as under-registering high-risk pregnancies. 
Options for payment. Because the share of births that result in a mother’s death are 
relatively rare, paying for all mothers who survive labor would not be a very discriminating 
incentive. For example, in Ethiopia, with a maternal mortality ratio of approximately 700 per 
100,000 live births, a COD Aid agreement that failed to distinguish incremental progress 
would be paying for more than 99,000 women who would be expected to survive labor 
under current conditions for every thousand who face high risks of mortality and the 
corresponding incentives to reduce mortality among this latter group would be rather low. 
On the other hand, paying for deaths averted or reductions in the maternal mortality ratio 
would be difficult for two reasons: the ability to project a counterfactual trend in maternal 
mortality is quite limited at this time, even in large countries; and the amounts that would be 
required to pay for each incremental advance would be quite large, making the total 
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payments very sensitive to the precision of the estimates. Taking into account these 
considerations, a working group might consider the following options: 
a.  The agreement could pay for all women who are registered during pregnancy and 
survive to a first postnatal consultation between 2 and 30 days after the birth. This 
would provide a systematic incentive to develop tracking systems and access to 
health care services for pregnant women, but would not provide a very 
discriminating incentive for specifically reducing maternal mortality. The payment 
per woman would be relatively low, though the annual payment could be quite large 
and would not be subject to large volatility. 
b.  The agreement could focus payments for women who are registered during 
pregnancy and survive to a first postnatal consultation from among the poorest 40 
percent of the population or in rural areas, although this raises difficulties in 
establishing a woman’s socioeconomic status or geographic residency. 
c.  The agreement could pay for the “number of maternal deaths avoided” – counting 
the number of maternal deaths each year and comparing it to a baseline in the initial 
year or relative to an epidemiological model. 
  
d.  The agreement could pay for the absolute number of deaths avoided or for a 
reduction in the maternal maternity ratio. The absolute number of deaths avoided is 
easier to explain and does not require accurately measuring total pregnancies and 
births. 
e.  The agreement could pay for every pregnant woman referred to a hospital maternity 
service and who the service certifies to be at high risk of birth complications. 
Intrapartum death, fresh stillbirths and neonatal deaths 
Definition. Intrapartum death refers to the death of a newborn that occurs during the time 
between onset of labor and the third stage of labor. Reliable cross-country data on 
intrapartum deaths is unavailable. Lawn, Shibuya and others (2005) estimated two related 
measures: stillbirths occurring intrapartum and neonatal deaths related to intrapartum events. 
Stillbirths occurring intrapartum, or “fresh stillbirths”, refer to late fetal deaths weighing more 
than 1000 grams or occurring after 28 weeks gestation, excluding those with severe lethal 
congenital abnormalities (Lawn, Shibuya and others 2005). Definitions also include those 
deaths without signs of skin disintegration or maceration, whose death is assumed to have 
occurred fewer than 12 hours prior to delivery (Lawn, Shibuya and others 2005; Buchmann 
and others 2002; Hinderaker and others 2003). For obstetric classifications, acute 
intrapartum events causing death such as antepartum hemorrhage and obstructed labor may 
also be considered equivalent (Lawn, Shibuya and others 2005). 
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Neonatal deaths related to intrapartum events includes neonatal deaths resulting from neonatal 
encephalopathy, neonates born at term who could not be resuscitated (or for whom 
resuscitation was not available) or specific birth trauma. Where possible, other causes such as 
lethal congenital malformations and extreme preterm birth (less than 34 completed weeks of 
gestation or birth weight < 1500 g) are excluded. 
Intrapartum stillbirths are more common than intrapartum-related neonatal deaths, 
especially in settings with limited emergency obstetric care (Barros and others 1987). Despite 
the significant global burden of preterm birth and stillbirths, these issues have received 
relatively little international attention (stillbirths are currently not included in MDG tracking 
and remain largely invisible in global policies) (Barros and others 2010). Neonatal deaths 
related to intrapartum events and intrapartum stillbirths are roughly two to four times more 
common than maternal mortality (Lawn, Shibuya and others 2005). 
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? Intrapartum deaths, fresh stillbirths and 
neonatal deaths are direct health outcomes. They are more common than maternal deaths 
and there is some evidence that they are correlated with poor maternal health.  
Neonatal deaths, or deaths within 28 days of birth, now account for more than 37 percent of 
under-five mortality (Lawn, Shibuya and others 2005). Complications that arise from 
preterm birth are the leading direct cause of neonatal mortality, accounting for an estimated 
27 percent of neonatal deaths every year (Lawn and others 2006). Annually, there are an 
estimated 3.2 million stillbirths in addition to the estimated 4 million neonatal deaths 
worldwide (Lawn and others 2010).  
Some studies have shown that maternal mortality is correlated with stillbirths (McClure and 
others 2007). Maternal mortality and stillbirths are associated with similar factors, particularly 
obstructed or very long labor, eclampsia and infections such as syphilis (Lawn, Cousens and 
others 2005). Poor maternal health before and during pregnancy increases the likelihood of 
maternal mortality as well as the likelihood that the child will die during labor or childbirth. 
Concerted efforts to address stillbirths, preterm births, and intrapartum deaths could 
significantly reduce both infant and maternal mortality and advance progress towards the 
fourth and fifth Millennium Development Goals.  
Is the indicator responsive to policy? The leading causes of intrapartum deaths are largely 
preventable, which increases the likelihood that programs aimed at addressing these causes 
will be successful. A number of hospital-based studies indicate that 25 to 62 percent of 
intrapartum stillbirths could be prevented with improved obstetric care and rapid responses 
to intrapartum complications, including reducing delays in both the initial recognition of 
complications and the amount of time it takes to travel to the hospital (Lawn, Shibuya and 
others 2005). In addition, preterm births can be prevented by smoking cessation and 
progesterone, and stillborn deaths can be prevented by interventions such as protein energy 
supplementation, screening and treatment of syphilis, intermittent presumptive treatment for 
malaria during pregnancy, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, birth preparedness, emergency 
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obstetric care, cesarean section for breech presentation, and elective induction for post-term 
delivery (Barros and others 2010).  
Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? Accurately and reliably measuring 
intrapartum deaths, fresh stillbirths or neonatal deaths is difficult. Only about 2 percent of 
the estimated 3 million stillbirths per year are counted through vital registration systems 
(Lawn and others 2010). Global estimates are currently based on household surveys or 
modeling. While vital registration systems have improved in many countries, the tracking of 
stillbirths remains incomplete and is highly variable by country; therefore the total number of 
annual births is largely unknown at the country level. Accurately and reliably measuring these 
indicators would require improvements in vital registration, increased coverage of 
professional birth attendance and public health outreach to pregnant women, as well as 
training and support for correctly classifying and reporting causes and timing of death. The 
one advantage that these measures have over measuring maternal mortality is that they are 
almost an order of magnitude more common and therefore could be estimated accurately 
and verified with smaller surveys. 
Potential unintended consequences. The agreement could pay for the absolute number of 
children that survive labor or for increasing the share of survivors over the total number of 
births in a given time period. The absolute number of infants who survive childbirth is easier 
to explain and measure, and does not require accurately measuring the total number of 
births. Deficiencies regarding stillbirth and preterm birth estimates make the denominator 
particularly difficult to estimate and measure, and may render the option of paying for the 
share of intrapartum survivors infeasible in many developing countries. As with the child 
survival indicator, paying for the absolute number of children runs the risk of encouraging 
higher fertility while paying for survival as a fraction of total births may provide disincentives 
for accurately registering all births.  
Options for payment. In developing a COD Aid agreement for reducing intrapartum deaths, 
a working group would have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different terms 
of payment. For example: 
a.  The agreement could pay for infants who are born to women whose pregnancies 
were registered and who survive at least one day after their birth. 
b.  The agreement could pay only for infant survival among those born into families 
from the poorest 40 percent of the population or in rural areas.  
c.  The agreement could pay for all infants who survive the intrapartum stage or only 
for the number above a baseline in order to create an incentive for progressing 
beyond current conditions.  
d.  The agreement could pay for the absolute number of children that survive or for 
increasing the share of survivors relative to an earlier cohort. The absolute number 
of newborns that survive is easier to explain and does not require accurately 
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measuring total births, although paying for the absolute number of children runs the 
risk of encouraging higher fertility. However, paying for survival as a fraction of 
total births may discourage accurate reporting of pregnancy, stillbirths and preterm 
births (i.e., recipients may be less likely to report a birth or having been pregnant if 
the child did not survive).  
e.  The agreement could pay for every pregnant woman referred to a hospital maternity 
service whom the service certifies to be at high risk of birth complications. 
Skilled Birth Attendance 
Definition. Skilled Birth Attendance (SBA) refers to a birth attended by a person who has 
the appropriate skills and operates within an “enabling environment” that includes transport 
and referral facilities for emergency obstetric care. The proportion of births attended by a 
skilled attendant is currently used as a proxy for maternal deaths for the purposes of tracking 
the fifth MDG (de Bernis and others 2003). 
WHO defines a “skilled birth attendant” as an accredited health professional (doctor, nurse 
or midwife) who has been educated and trained to proficiency in the skills needed to manage 
uncomplicated pregnancies, childbirth and the immediate postnatal period, and in the 
identification, management and referral of complications in women and newborns. WHO 
emphasizes the importance of skilled birth attendance, and this policy has been incorporated 
into a continuum of maternal and child care policy established with the formation of the 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health in 2005.  
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? SBA is not a health outcome, rather it is 
a health service or output of the health system. Nevertheless, the difficulty of obtaining 
accurate estimates of maternal mortality has led WHO and others to use the percentage of 
live births attended by skilled health personnel as a proxy for maternal mortality due to 
reasonable levels of correlation between the two indicators (Graham and others 2008).  
Research suggests that SBA may reduce or prevent a large share of the four most common 
causes of maternal death and morbidity during childbirth: obstructed labor complications, 
eclampsia, puerperal sepsis, and obstetric hemorrhages (Graham and others 2001). 
Improving maternal health through increased access to skilled attendance at birth is also 
associated with a reduction in the number and frequency of stillbirths and perinatal mortality 
(Gelband and others 2001). Some research argues that the presence of skilled personnel at 
birth is a significant predictor of maternal mortality, while recognizing limitations in the 
design of these studies that make it difficult to identify a causal relationship between SBA 
and maternal mortality ratios (Buor and Bream 2004). A recent literature review of 10 
individual studies goes even further, finding “little evidence that giving birth with a health 
professional reduces a woman’s risk of dying, and in some settings it appears to be 
associated with an increased risk of death” (Scott and Ronsman 2009). Therefore, utilizing 
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SBA as a proxy for maternal mortality in a COD Aid agreement may be premature; better 
evidence is needed to be certain it is an appropriate indicator. 
One of the attractions of this indicator is that it may be highly correlated with the coverage 
and quality of health care services more generally. Interventions aimed at expanding 
coverage of SBA seem to require basic reforms to strengthen health systems, improve health 
education, assure availability of medical supplies, and address problems in management and 
contracting. In addition, the lack of pre-service training at the primary health care level has 
been identified as a major issue in major developing countries. In this way, SBA may be a 
better proxy for health system capacity than of health outcomes, per se. 
Is the indicator responsive to policy? Because SBA is a health output and not an outcome, it 
is more directly responsive to public policy action. Even so, achieving high rates of SBA 
coverage is a difficult task in most low- and middle-income countries because it requires 
policies that address a full range of health system functions related to financing, health care 
personnel, contracting, accreditation, supplies, facilities, transportation, information 
management and reporting. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that policies can increase SBA 
coverage. The more important question is whether whether the desired health outcome – 
improved maternal health – is responsive to SBA.  
Many developing countries have been able to improve access to skilled birth attendance and 
costs associated with doing so are relatively low. Depending on the level of complications 
that arise from giving birth, the cost of a skilled attendant ranges from US$2 to US$100, 
while each maternal and perinatal death averted is estimated to cost between US$1,000 to 
US$3,000 (Gelband and others 2001). Some studies show that programs to train and deploy 
skilled midwives in resource-poor settings have been successful (cited in Becker and others 
2006).  
Is the measure quantifiable with sufficient precision? Despite the fact that the ratio of births 
attended by skilled health personnel is an established indicator of maternal health for the 
MDGs and for the World Banks 14th IDA Replenishment, lack of regular data collection 
presents a major challenge for using this indicator (Becker and others 2006). Accurate 
measurement would not only require comprehensive registration of pregnant women and 
births, but also a national registry of individuals who are recognized as “skilled birth 
attendants.” Furthermore, it would be necessary to find some way of establishing whether 
these individuals are supported by the necessary “enabling environment,” taking into 
account, for example, the 1997 UN Process Indicators which assess the availability, use and 
quality of Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC).  
Potential unintended consequences. A program directed at increasing SBA would privilege 
one particular form of public health policy over others, even if this policy comprehends a 
wide range of activities to assure the availability of trained personnel throughout the country 
with adequate support for medical supplies, facilities, and emergency referral. If countries 
that increase SBA coverage really do, in that process, strengthen their health systems in ways 
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that reduce maternal mortality without compromising other important activities that draw on 
similar financial and human resources (such as prenatal care, family planning, nutrition, 
prevention of unwanted and teenage pregnancies, prevention and management of unsafe 
abortion, and even prevention and management of common diseases in pregnant women, 
such as malaria and anemia), then the risks of distorting policy decisions is small. If, 
however, SBA is not the most effective way of reducing maternal mortality and it diverts 
attention from other important activities, then payment to increase SBA coverage could 
generate perverse outcomes. 
Options for payment. In developing a COD Aid agreement for increased skilled birth 
attendance, a working group would have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
different terms of payment. For example: 
a.  The simplest agreement would simply pay for all births attended by skilled birth 
attendants each year.  
b.  The agreement could specifically pay for all births attended by skilled birth 
attendants for women from the poorest 40 percent of the population or in rural 
areas.  
c.  The agreement could pay for all births attended by skilled birth attendants or only 
for the number above a baseline in order to encourage progressing beyond current 
conditions. In general, paying for progress above a baseline would draw greater 
attention to women from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds who are 
less likely to already have access to SBA.  
d.  The agreement could pay for the absolute number of births or for increasing the 
share that are appropriately attended. The absolute number of births attended is 
easier to explain and does not require accurately measuring the total number of 
births; however, paying for the number of births attended might encourage higher 
fertility. By contrast, paying for the share of births attended removes the incentive 
to increase fertility. It does, however, create an incentive not to count pregnant 
women who are unlikely to receive care, thereby reducing the denominator of the 
indicator. 
e.  The agreement could pay for reducing the number of women in rural areas with 
obstetric complications who fail to receive emergency care. The indicator “Unmet 
Need for Emergency Obstetric Care” is defined as the share of women with 
obstetric complications who are treated at a health facility which offers emergency 
obstetric care and may be more closely related to reducing maternal mortality. It 
would also create an incentive for skilled birth attendance so as to assure 




f.  The agreement could pay for every pregnant woman referred by a skilled birth 
attendant to a hospital maternity service whom the service certifies to be at high risk 
of birth complications. By restricting rewarded referrals to those made by a SBA, the 
program would increase the incentives to train SBAs and delegate triage and referral 
decisions to this class of personnel. 
Indicators for Combating HIV/AIDS and Malaria  
HIV/AIDS: Sustaining Treatment 
Definition. A COD Aid agreement could agree to pay a country for providing anti-retroviral 
treatment (ART) or other appropriate medications to HIV-positive individuals who need 
treatment. 
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? Most people whose CD4 counts have 
dropped substantially and exhibit AIDS symptoms experience significant improvements in 
life quality and extended years of life when they adhere to an appropriate ART regimen. 
Some evidence indicates that by reducing the viral load, ART can reduce the risk of 
transmitting the virus to sexual partners. It can also reduce the risk of mother to child 
transmission of HIV (Li and others 1998, Hogg and others 1998). Since AIDS treatment 
programs in poor countries lose as many as 20 percent of those enrolled during the first year 
of treatment and approximately 5 percent every subsequent year, sustaining patients on 
treatment is a challenge. Health care providers are often compensated more highly for 
complicated procedures, which are more likely to be required by new patients than by 
established patients whose successful treatment needs to be sustained. This is particularly 
likely for new patients who initiate treatment later. New WHO guidelines recommend 
patients be started earlier because earlier treatment initiation leads to greater survival (Over 
2010b).  
Is the indicator responsive to policy? Successful ART programs and reduced HIV infections 
at the national level are associated with strong national leadership that encourages testing 
and counseling, supports access to trained medical personnel and outreach services, 
subsidizes the costs of care, creates incentives for individuals to stay on treatment, and 
provides appropriate support services (Mokomane and others 2002; Nattrass 2008; Over 
2010b). 
Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? ART is a relatively costly service due 
to the price of medications and the need for trained personnel to supervise treatment. 
Therefore, most individuals who are receiving ART in developing countries are registered in 
administrative systems. The count of individuals is likely to be accurate and verification 
under a COD Aid agreement would provide useful information to improve the accuracy of 
administrative reporting – especially when health systems are vulnerable to corrupt practices 
such as stealing drugs or registering phantom patients in order to file false claims. 
26 
 
Unintended consequences. Paying for countries to sustain treatment of individuals living 
with AIDS could have several negative effects. The main concern is that it could divert 
attention away from preventing infections and toward treatment because the country 
receives no financial benefit from an averted infection but does receive a positive financial 
incentive for treating those who are infected. With a limited treatment budget, this payment 
would reward national health systems for sustaining existing patients more than it would 
reward recruiting new patients. However, this bias could be beneficial if it counters existing 
biases in the other direction. Risks that countries might register people for treatment who are 
not ill are probably minimized by the high cost of treatment. 
Options for payment. Hallett and Over (2010) propose to reward countries that sustain 
individuals on treatment. They note that AIDS treatment in the developing world currently 
costs between US$500 and US$1,500 per patient-year and propose a COD Aid agreement 
that would pay somewhat more for incremental months the longer a patient survives. For 
example, the donor could pay US$100 for every patient starting treatment in a given year, 
US$125 for every patient in the second year of treatment, US$150 for every patient in the 
third year, US$175 for every patient in the fourth year, and US$200 for every patient in the 
fifth or any subsequent year of treatment. The COD Aid payments would complement 
existing aid flows or domestic funds that currently pay for AIDS treatment inputs. This 
arrangement would maximize the number of life-years saved by AIDS treatment 
expenditures for any given treatment budget (Hallett and Over 2010).  
HIV/AIDS: Averted Infections 
Unlike a health outcome such as stunting or maternal mortality, which always reflects poor 
health and is therefore always to be discouraged, the total number of people living with 
HIV/AIDS, called the “prevalence” of HIV, reflects both new infections which the country 
has failed to prevent and survival of those with HIV/AIDS, whose lives the country has 
successfully extended. For this reason, a COD agreement to encourage HIV prevention 
should reward a reduction in the new cases of HIV, i.e. a reduction in the “incidence” of 
HIV, instead of attempting to reward a reduction in HIV prevalence.6  
Definition. Averted HIV infections is defined as the difference between the number of new 
HIV infections that are expected in a given period (the counterfactual) minus the number of 
new HIV infections that actually occur.  
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? To the extent that the indicator 
accurately measures averted infections, it is a very close proxy for reducing the morbidity and 
mortality that follow HIV infection, with a median lag-time of about nine years. Reduction 
in adult HIV incidence also prevents mother to child transmission of HIV, prevents orphan-
                                                       
6 It is noteworthy that the original statement of the Millennium Development Goal number 6, which calls 
for combating AIDS, malaria and other infectious diseases, mandated a reduction in overall adult HIV prevalence 
without regard to the fact that effective treatment would increase prevalence. 
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hood and its attendant health and poverty risks to the orphaned children and prevents the 
need for AIDS treatment.  
Is the indicator responsive to policy? Several countries – Thailand, Brazil and Uganda – have 
demonstrated that the HIV epidemic can be slowed through public policy. A number of 
specific public policy interventions have also been shown to lower the rate of new infections, 
including male circumcision, couples counseling, “test and treat” strategies, voucher 
programs, and paying girls to stay in school (Auvert and others 2005; Allen and others 2003; 
Thornton and others 2008; and The World Bank 20107). Increasingly, HIV/AIDS experts 
believe that prevention efforts work best in combination with one another. Furthermore, 
like a country’s fertility rate or age of marriage, HIV incidence also responds to shifts in 
cultural trends which may respond to national leadership more than they do to individual 
government policies. These characteristics of the HIV prevention challenge suggest that an 
overarching incentive like COD could be particularly useful to incentivize the synergistic 
cooperation of people in different government bureaucracies and in the private sector under 
the leadership of motivated national figures towards the joint goal of achieving the COD 
objectives.  
Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? As is the case for maternal mortality or 
any rare negative health outcome, the precise measurement of the number of new HIV 
infections requires a large sample size. In any given year, fewer than 2 percent of individuals 
will become newly infected and precisely measuring the difference from one period to the 
next would therefore require relatively large surveys, involving blood tests for between 
50,000 and 100,000 individuals. (Currently the DHS collect blood and estimate HIV 
prevalence on samples of 5,000 to 10,000 individuals.) Finally, the precision of measuring 
averted infections depends on the accuracy of the counterfactual. Estimating the number of 
new HIV infections that are likely to have occurred in a given period depends on the 
accuracy of data used to estimate model parameters and on the validity of the selected 
mathematical models.  
Two methods have been proposed for measuring the number of averted infections (Hallett 
and Over 2010): a prevalence modeling approach and a “tests of recent infection” approach. 
The prevalence modeling approach compares the observed trend in prevalence between a 
baseline and follow-up survey to a counterfactual projection of the prevalence that would 
have been observed after incorporating information on the uptake of antiretroviral therapy 
and assuming no other change in historical trends in incidence and mortality. The tests of 
recent infection approach uses technological advances in diagnostic tools to directly measure 
how many individuals are newly infected. These tests differentiate new from old infections 
by taking advantage of the fact that the immunological response to HIV evolves over the 
                                                       
7 This report is unpublished, but the study results were announced by the “The World Bank News and 





first months of infection. While initial efforts showed these tests to be biased upwards, 
recent advances have increased their accuracy.  
Unintended consequences. The most cynical concern for a program that pays to avert HIV 
infections is that the recipient would find some way to increase the rate of infection at the 
time of the baseline survey in order to inflate later payments. Another concern is that it 
could encourage recipients to engage in practices that would violate the human rights of 
those currently infected. 
Options for payment. Hallett and Over (2010) propose ten different payout functions for 
the two measurement approaches (prevalence modeling and tests of recent infection) and 
assess them in terms of their attractiveness to funders and recipients and the impact of 
precision in estimating the number of averted infections. Six of the measures are threshold 
functions, paying a fixed amount if the ratio of the new to the old estimated incidence rate is 
below a certain level or the change is statistically significant. The other four are continuous 
functions, paying in proportion to the estimated reduction in incidence up to a maximum.  
The continuous functions are more compatible with the principles of COD Aid as described 
by Birdsall and Savedoff (2010). These include paying linearly in proportion to the reduction 
in incidence or paying linearly, convexly or concavely in proportion to the reduction in 
incidence with a bonus if the reduction reaches statistical significance. The simplest example 
would be to measure the number of new infections every two years and pay US$100 for 
every HIV infection averted relative to the counterfactual estimate. 
For Discussion: A COD Aid Proposal for Reducing New HIV Infections  
Payments 
  First year, funders pay costs of a large comprehensive population-wide survey of 
the HIV infection status of the adult population. Funders and recipients agree on 
a team of modelers to construct a prediction for how many people will be 
infected with HIV in the next 5 years. Funders commission that team to estimate 
future HIV infection, an estimate which will serve as the counterfactual. 
  First through third year, funders pay for data collection on the number of HIV-
infected adults who are enrolled in antiretroviral treatment programs. 
  Third year, funders pay costs of a second large comprehensive population-wide 
survey of the HIV infection status of the adult population. The modeling team is 
charged with estimating how many HIV infections have been averted. 
  Third year, Recipient country is paid US$100 for every infection averted.  
  This process is repeated every three years. 
 (Note: the agreement has a self-limiting feature with funding declining to zero as 
the annual number of new infections reaches a floor, which will hopefully be the 





Any low-income country with a high baseline rate of HIV incidence would be eligible to 
sign an agreement up to a cap established by available funds.  
 
Conditions 
Countries that sign the agreement would agree: 
  To allow independent verification of the survey sampling procedure. 
  To agree with the donor on a mutually acceptable group of modelers to 
generate the estimate of the number of new infections that would occur 
according to historical trends (the counterfactual). 
  To allow an independent “social audit” to monitor HIV prevention programs to 
assure that the programs reflect internationally agreed human rights standards 
  To accept the estimates of the counterfactual number of HIV infections 
provided by the mutually acceptable modeling group. 
  To assist researchers in evaluating the COD Aid agreement. 
 
Malaria: Reducing or Sustaining Reductions in the Prevalence of 
Malaria
8  
Since malaria is an acute disease, not a chronic disease like HIV infection, the number of 
cases at any one time, or the prevalence of the disease, is an adequate measure of the burden 
of the disease and the reduction in prevalence adequately measures accomplishments in the 
struggle against it. 
Definition. Malaria is a disease caused by infection with a parasite, most commonly P. 
falciparum or P. vivax. A number of indicators are available that vary in terms of their 
appropriateness for different goals (e.g. eradication or control, reducing or sustaining 
reductions in incidence) and different contexts (e.g. hyperendemic, endemic). In places with 
high rates of infection, the standard Parasite Rate (standard PR) can be used, defined as the 
prevalence of non-infective asexual blood-stage parasites in children between the ages of 2 
and 10. In places where malarial incidence has been reduced and is being sustained, the 
Annual Parasite Index (API) may be more useful; it measures the number of malaria fevers per 
year per 1,000 people.  
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? The standard PR and the API are closely 
associated with morbidity and mortality from malaria; in addition, they are useful for tracking 
                                                       




the effectiveness of control or elimination programs (Smith and others 2009). Nearly half a 
billion people each year are infected by malarial parasites (Snow and others 2005), and the 
disease kills more than a million people each year (Greenwood and others 2005). In endemic 
areas, malaria infection during pregnancy accounts for up to 25 percent of all cases of severe 
maternal anemia, and is the cause of 10-20 percent of low birth weight babies (Guyatt and 
others 2001). The majority of malaria-related deaths occur in Africa.  
Is the indicator responsive to policy? Infection rates from malaria are responsive to a 
number of policies but effectiveness varies across contexts due to differences in mosquito 
vectors, human behavior, availability of health care services, differences among parasites and 
levels of drug-resistance, etc. Effective interventions currently available include killing adult 
mosquitoes by increasing the use of insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and indoor residual 
spraying (IRS); controlling larvae through biological or chemical agents and environmental 
management; and treating infections with artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) 
(Over and others 2004). 
The appropriate strategies for addressing malaria vary significantly between areas with high 
rates of infection and those with low rates. They also differ between contexts in which the 
goal is to control or eliminate malaria. COD Aid agreements aimed at reducing malaria 
infection rates are feasible but may involve substantial risks of diverting resources or 
distorting strategies (see unintended consequences below). By contrast, a COD Aid 
agreement aimed at sustaining malaria control and elimination in countries that have 
achieved low infection rates could be quite promising – creating a financial incentive to 
sustain efforts whose benefits may otherwise be less visible to public policymakers.  
Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? Relying on administrative reporting is 
problematic because individuals do not always seek care for malarial symptoms and 
diagnoses are frequently inaccurate. The reported number of cases of fever overestimates the 
number of malaria cases, while the number of cases confirmed by blood tests underestimates 
that number (Over and others 2004). Nevertheless, advances in technology have simplified 
and lowered the costs of diagnostic tests and, when combined with survey methods, can 
accurately measure the standard PR. In countries that have achieved malaria control or 
elimination and are trying to sustain those gains, health services are usually good enough to 
provide reliable epidemiological surveillance to support accurate measurement of the API.  
A further difficulty with measuring progress in combating malaria is the difficulty of 
establishing a counterfactual. Depending on context, the incidence of malaria varies 
seasonally and year-to-year for reasons related to environmental changes along with trends in 
human settlement and behaviors. While it is possible to model trends in malarial incidence, 
the accuracy of the projections may be difficult to explain and use as a counterfactual in 
COD Aid agreements. As with the discussion of averting HIV/AIDS infections above, 
payment terms could include provisions that modify payments in proportion to accuracy. 
One advantage of paying for sustained reductions in malarial incidence is that the 
counterfactual is relatively easy to define – a country that has eradicated malaria or reached a 
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low level of incidence could be paid against a baseline established by the prevalence of 
malaria prior to the success of the eradication or control program. Thus, funders would be 
paying to sustain the gains in averting malarial infections based on a clear counterfactual.  
Unintended consequences. A COD Aid agreement that paid for reductions in the standard 
Parasite Rate or declines in API could provide a strong incentive for combating malaria in a 
way that empowers recipient countries to choose the appropriate mix of strategies while 
reducing the transaction costs involved in traditional aid modalities. However, such an 
agreement could still have problematic unintended consequences, either by distorting anti-
malarial efforts or diverting attention from other health needs.  
The first risk is that countries being paid to reduce the standard Parasite Rate might choose 
to focus exclusively and extensively on treating children between the ages of 2 and 10. 
Intensely treating this population might reduce the standard PR and lower morbidity among 
children but without affecting infection among adults or reducing the reservoir of parasites 
among mosquitoes. Such a strategy focusing excessively on treatment could also lead to 
overuse of anti-malarial drugs, unintentionally increasing drug resistance. Finally, treatment 
among children could also delay the emergence of natural immunity among this 
subpopulation, deferring morbidity and mortality until later in life. Because malaria control is 
more effective when different strategies are combined (e.g. larva control, ITNs, IRS and 
treatment), anything that encourages focus on a particular strategy is likely to hinder progress 
against the disease overall (Over and others 2004). 
A second risk of paying for reductions in the standard Parasite Rate or declines in API is that 
resources might be diverted from other more urgent health needs. In many places, malaria is 
the leading cause of morbidity and mortality among children and a leading cause of 
morbidity and mortality among adults. But there are also places where respiratory infections 
like pneumonia are more prominent and are even misdiagnosed as malaria. Even when funds 
are additional, the demands on the time of health professionals or community workers could 
be stretched by efforts to combat malaria. 
Addressing these risks might require establishing eligibility criteria that focus on countries or 
regions where malaria is clearly a high priority. Alternatively, the indicator could be changed 
to measure, say, the Parasite Rate in the entire population (though this poses other technical 
challenges) rather than focusing on children. A program aimed at sustaining malaria control, 
paying for sustaining a low API, would be less likely to generate some of these unintended 
consequences. Instead, it would provide a financial incentive to sustain investments in 
activities whose benefits (maintaining low infection rates) are invisible to the public, yet 
necessary for controlling the disease. 
Options for payment. The payout function would differ between agreements aimed at 
reducing the Parasite Rate in areas with endemic malaria and those aimed at sustaining the 
elimination or control of malaria at low rates of prevalence. Once the focus is established – 
sustaining control or reducing malarial prevalence – a working group would have to consider 
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the advantages and disadvantages of different terms of payment. These include paying 
linearly in proportion to the reduction in incidence or paying linearly, convexly or concavely 
in proportion to the reduction in incidence with a bonus if the reduction reaches statistical 
significance (as described in Hallett and Over 2010 with respect to HIV/AIDS). The 
simplest example would be to measure the number of new infections every year and pay a 
fixed sum for every malarial infection averted relative to the counterfactual estimate. 
Alternatively, recipients could be paid a fixed amount for reducing incidence below the 
established baseline (similar to the “threshold function” outlined in Hallett and Over 2010 
with regard to HIV/AIDS). The agreement could pay for reducing or sustaining reductions 
in malaria infection among the entire population or could focus on specific populations such 
as pregnant women and children. Focusing on subpopulations has the advantage of focusing 
attention on groups that are at higher risk but also increase the difficulties of establishing a 
counterfactual and obtaining precise estimates of incidence.  
Indicator for Improving Health Information for Public Health 
Policy 
Number of Accurately Registered Births 
Definition. Vital registration systems provide public records for monitoring and tracking 
births, deaths, cause of death, and pregnancy. Accurately registering births in a country is 
one of the pillars of an effective vital registration system, which is critical to a country’s 
ability to conduct public policies of many kinds but especially for public health policy. Good 
vital registration systems improve the accuracy of all social survey data; provide registered 
individuals with greater access to social welfare, health care, education and employment 
services; improve governments’ ability to track health risks; and make it possible to 
accurately measure relatively rare events such as maternal mortality.  
Is the indicator a good proxy for health outcomes? Accurately registering births is not a 
good proxy for health outcomes at all; however, it is important to any assessment of a 
country’s health status and the evaluation of any intervention. Improved birth registration 
systems are necessary to generate estimates of the magnitude and prevalence of health issues, 
to identify determinants of key problems, to detect differences in levels of health status and 
service delivery within a country, to recognize emerging health issues, to permit cross 
country comparisons, and to facilitate monitoring of health programs and policies (Graham 
and others 2008). 
Is the indicator responsive to policy? While the links between accurate birth registration and 
health outcomes are quite indirect, the links between public policy and accurate birth 
registration are quite strong. Accurately registering births is an activity which is well within 
the purview of most governments so long as they pass appropriate legislation, implement 
regulations, elicit cooperation from the medical and health community, and reach out to 
citizens and communities to explain the benefits of registration. 
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Is the indicator quantifiable with sufficient precision? The indicator can be accurately 
measured and verified through a combination of population surveys and audits. However, it 
may not be appropriate for a COD Aid agreement because it is not a payment for an outcome. 
It may be difficult to convince funders that paying an incentive for birth registration, rather 
than for a health outcome, is of sufficient benefit to justify the effort and funds. 
Nevertheless, concerns over the poor quality of population health and demographic data 
needed for tracking the use of foreign aid could make this an attractive initiative. The 
growing interest in results-based financing mechanisms has highlighted the need for better 
health outcome data in developing countries (Graham and others 2008).  
Potential unintended consequences. Paying for the number of registered births could create 
an incentive to increase fertility which may be problematic in countries with high birth rates 
and poverty. For this reason, the amount paid per registered birth should probably not be 
very large. The effect on fertility would depend upon the strategies employed by the 
recipient to increase registration. Strategies that provide incentives to health care 
professionals to seek out pregnant women and assure their births are registered are less likely 
to increase fertility than direct incentives to women and families. Nevertheless, this risk 
would have to be carefully monitored. 
Options for payment. The simplest approach for a COD Aid agreement to increase birth 
registrations would provide a small fixed payment for each registered birth. This would give 
countries almost a guaranteed minimum payment based on the coverage of their existing 
vital registration system but by requiring verification it would also create a powerful check 
on the quality of the existing system. 
A second alternative would be to pay for the number of birth registrations above a baseline 
established when the agreement is signed. In countries with growing or stable populations, 
there would be an incentive to seek out and register larger and larger shares of each birth 
cohort. In countries where the number of births is declining, however, this would create a 
relatively weak incentive to improve the reach of birth registration. 
A third alternative would be to pay for increases in the share of births that are registered, 
such as a fixed amount of money for each 1 percent increase in coverage. The difficulties 
with this approach are that the vital registration system itself provides key information for 
estimating the denominator, i.e. the size of the birth cohort. Detailed surveys and 
investigative work could provide verification but would be difficult.  
It might be most effective to combine this approach with others. For example, small 
payments for registration of each pregnant woman and each birth could establish a baseline 




A COD Aid proposal for health will need to clarify the objective, identify an indicator, set 
payment amounts, and establish a mechanism for independent verification. The indicators 
presented above may provide useful proxies for the outcome of improved health. Each 
should be assessed with regard to its relation to the overall goal, feasibility, precision, and 
verifiability, as well as whether it will introduce distortions or create unintended 
consequences in the specified setting. It is hoped that this note will contribute to the 
discussion for further refining a COD Aid proposal for health that could then be submitted 
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Appendix 1: Millennium Development Goals Four, Five and Six 
Millennium Development Goal Four (MDG 4) – Child Mortality 
Target 1: To reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality 
rate  
  In low-income countries, one out of every ten children dies before the age of 
five. In wealthier nations, this number is only one out of 143.  
  When we include stillbirths in infant mortality statistics, about half of all deaths 
of children under age five occur under the age of 28 days.  
  Persistent high levels of infant and child mortalities are one of the greatest 
failures of the global health sector.  
  If current trends continue, the MDG will not be achieved until 2045 – 30 years 
late.  
Millennium Development Goal Five (MDG 5) – Maternal Health 
Target 1: Between 1990 and 2015, reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three 
quarters. 
  Although most maternal deaths are preventable, MDG 5 is proving hard to 
reach – despite maternal health being high on the international agenda for more 
than two decades.  
  More than half a million women continue to die each year from complications 
of pregnancy and childbirth, almost all in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Some 
progress has -been made in reducing maternal deaths, although not in the 
countries where giving birth is most risky 
  In some parts of Africa (for example, Malawi and Zimbabwe) maternal deaths 
are increasing. This is attributable to high HIV prevalence, conflict, and 
deteriorating health systems (DFID 2010). 
Target 2: Achieve universal access to reproductive health  
  More women are receiving antenatal care 
  Inequalities in care during pregnancy are striking 
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  Only one in three rural women in developing regions receive the recommended 
care during pregnancy 
  Progress has stalled in reducing the number of teenage pregnancies, putting 
more young mothers at risk 
  Poverty and lack of education perpetuate high adolescent birth rates 
  Progress in expanding the use of contraceptives by women has slowed 
  Use of contraception is lowest among the poorest women and those with no 
education 
  Inadequate funding for family planning is a major failure in fulfilling 
commitments to improving women’s reproductive health 
Millennium Development Goal Six (MDG 6) – Combat HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
Target 1: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
  The spread of HIV appears to have stabilized in most regions, and more people 
are surviving longer 
  Many young people still lack the knowledge to protect themselves against HIV 
  Empowering women through AIDS education is indeed possible, as a number 
of countries have shown 
  In sub-Saharan Africa, knowledge of HIV increases with wealth and among 
those living in urban areas 
  Disparities are found in condom use by women and men and among those 
from the richest and poorest households 
  Condom use during high-risk sex is gaining acceptance in some countries and is 
one facet of effective HIV prevention 
  Mounting evidence shows a link between gender-based violence and HIV 
  Children orphaned by AIDS suffer more than the loss of parents 
Target 2: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS  
for all those who need it 
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  The rate of new HIV infections continues to outstrip the expansion of 
treatment 
  Expanded treatment for HIV-positive women also safeguards their newborns 
Target 3: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria  
& other major diseases 
  Production of insecticide-treated mosquito nets soars 
  Across Africa, expanded use of insecticide-treated bed nets is protecting 
communities from malaria 
  Poverty continues to limit use of mosquito nets 
  Global procurement of more effective antimalarial drugs continues to rise 
rapidly 
  Children from the poorest households are least likely to receive treatment for 
malaria 
  External funding is helping to reduce malaria incidence and deaths, but 
additional support is needed  
  Progress on tuberculosis inches forward 
  Tuberculosis prevalence is falling in most regions 
  Tuberculosis remains the second leading killer after HIV 
Source: United Nations Millennium Development Goals: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals)  
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